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Modern federal courts scholars have been fascinated by the 
question of Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. 1 This fascination is not difficult to explain: the 
question is theoretically profound and raises fundamental issues 
about the roles of Congress and the federal courts in the consti-
tutional order? As a practical matter, however, the question has 
proven to be of limited significance. Despite a recent spate of 
legislation restricting access to courts by prisoners and immi-
grants,3 people talk about wholesale jurisdiction-stripping far 
more than they actually do it. 
By contrast, Congress routinely regulates the manner in 
which federal courts exercise their jurisdiction. A host of federal 
statutes seek to guide, and even control, the process of decision-
making that federal courts employ to decide cases within their 
jurisdiction. This crucial aspect of congressional power, how-
ever, has been largely neglected by federal courts scholars-and 
by the courts themselves, who have quietly acquiesced in wide-
ranging congressional efforts to control the judicial decision-
making process.4 Given the relative importance of questions 
* Professor of Law, Boston University. I am grateful to Akhil Amar, John Harri-
son, Mike Paulsen, and Larry Yackle for their generous advice on this article; it is are-
flection on me rather than on them that I failed to follow much of it. Much of the 
groundwork for this article was laid while I was a Professor at Northwestern University 
School of Law, and I am indebted to that institution for its support. 
I. A list of major works on the topic since 1984 recently filled a page-long foot-
note. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial 
Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 75,76 n.2. 
2. The President, of course, is a player in this matter as well: any federal statute 
concerning the jurisdiction of the federal courts must survive the presentment process. 
See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 7, cis. 2-3. 
3. For a thoughtful series of articles describing and evaluating these statutes, see 
Symposium: Congress and the Courts: Jurisdiction and Remedies, 86 Georgetown. L.J. 
2445-2636 (1998). 
4. See, for example, Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (broadly upholding Con-
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concerning control of jurisdiction and control of decision-
making, the widespread neglect of the latter is noteworthy. 
There are signs, however, that congressional regulation of 
the judicial process may finally be attracting significant academic 
attention. In recent years, four of the nation's most insightful 
constitutional scholars have addressed some aspect of this topic. 
In 1995, Professor Martin H. Redish concluded, as part of a 
wide-ranging study of judicial independence, that Congress has 
broad power to prescribe substantive and procedural rules for 
the judiciary but that separation-of-powers principles place im-
portant limits on that power when its exercise affects the way in 
which cases are decided. 5 According to Professor Redish, the 
decisional independence principle precludes direct legislative 
control of judicial outcomes,6 while the political commitment 
principle 7 forbids Congress from using the trappings and prestige 
of the federal courts to hide substantive legislative decisions 
from the electorate.8 
In 1999, Professor David Engdahl identified the Sweeping 
Clause of Article I, Section 89 as the constitutional source of 
congressional power to regulate the jurisdictional, structural, and 
decisional affairs of the federal courts. 10 Professor Engdahl 
urges courts to decide for themselves whether congressional 
gress' power to regulate the substance and form of judicial decisions concerning injunc-
tions in prison litigation); sec also note 130. 
5. Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political 
Perspectives, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 697 (1995). 
6. See id. at 707-14. 
7. This principle requires that legislation carry "some meaningful level of norma-
tive political commitment by the enacting legislators, thus enabling the electorate to 
judge its representatives." Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 136 
(Oxford U. Press, 1995). 
8. For example, Professor Redish argues that if Congress adopts standard "A" as 
a substantive rule of decision, it cannot then regulate the judicial decisionmaking process 
in a way that effectively requires "B" as the outcome in adjudications-even if Congress 
could have directly prescribed "B" as the governing substantive standard. See Redish, 46 
Mercer L. Rev. at 715-16 (cited in note 5). Cf. Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First Principle: 
A Proposed Solution, 86 Georgetown L.J. 2525, 2529 (1998) (suggesting that United 
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), stands for the analogous principle that 
"[t]he judiciary will not permit its articulate authority to be subverted to serve ends an-
tagonistic to its actual judgment; the judiciary will resist efforts to make it seem to sup-
port and regularize that with which it in fact disagrees"). 
9. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (declaring that Congress shall have power 
"(t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof'). Professor Engdahl, in ac-
cordance with modern practice, calls this clause the "Necessary and Proper Oause." The 
founding generation, however, uniformly termed it the "Sweeping Clause." 
10. See Engdahl, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 94-104 (cited in note 1). 
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measures regulating the judiciary in fact aid or hinder the "carry-
ing into Execution" of the judicial power, which he argues calls 
into question the validity of such familiar statutes as the Anti-
Injunction Act, some of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and a 
host of other measures designed to regulate the remedies and 
procedures employed by the federal courts. 11 
Two recent articles specifically consider the power of Con-
gress to regulate the use of precedent by federal courts. Profes-
sor Michael Stokes Paulsen has urged adoption of a statute that 
would forbid the federal courts from giving prior court decisions 
any weight beyond their persuasive value in future cases involv-
ing the constitutionality of abortion regulations (or in constitu-
tional cases more generally). 12 He agrees with Professor Eng-
dahl that the Sweeping Clause is the key constitutional provision 
for analyzing congressional power over the courts, but he finds 
in that clause a power at least broad enough to restrict the use of 
precedent in constitutional cases. 13 And Professor John Harri-
son has argued for a similar, though perhaps narrower, congres-
sional power under the Sweeping Clause to mandate any norm 
of precedent that courts could reasonably adopt for themselves. 14 
All of these authors make critical contributions to an explo-
ration of this issue, but each of them misses an important piece 
of the puzzle. Professor Redish correctly draws attention to the 
importance of background norms of separation of powers, but he 
does not discuss the central role played by the Sweeping Clause 
in any assessment of congressional power to regulate the courts. 
Professor Engdahl neatly articulates the role of the Sweeping 
Clause, but his analysis of that clause is incomplete. Professor 
Engdahl emphasizes the requirement that laws regulating the ju-
diciary must be "for carrying into Execution" the judicial power, 
but he pays scant attention to the separate requirement that such 
laws be "necessary and proper" for that purpose. As I have 
elsewhere explained at length, in conjunction with Patricia B. 
Granger, the term "proper" in the Sweeping Clause is an impor-
II. See id. at 158-74. 
12. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress 
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535 (2000). 
13. See id. at 1590-94. 
14. John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke 
L.J. 503 (2000). Professor Harrison's analysis may lead to a narrower view of congres-
sional power than does Professor Paulsen's because the former pays more attention than 
the latter to the requirement that congressional statutes actually "carry[] into Execution" 
the judicial power. On the other hand, this may be more a difference of focus than of 
substance. 
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tant limitatism on the scope of the power granted to Congress by 
that clause.]) Professor Paulsen places the issue of congressional 
power in its appropriate practical and historical context and rec-
ognizes the need to take account of the word "proper" in the 
Sweeping Clause, but he fails to see that the term "proper" 
draws much of its content from background separation-of-
powers principles, more or less (to complete the circle) in accor-
dance with Professor Redish's analysis. Professor Harrison simi-
larly does not give due regard to the extent to which separation-
of-powers concerns, and in particular Professor Redish's princi-
ple of decisional independence, are codified in the Sweeping 
Clause. 
What is needed for a full exploration of Congress' power to 
regulate the affairs of the federal courts is a (no pun intended) 
proper synthesis that gives due account to the text of the Sweep-
ing Clause, the background norms that animate it, and the struc-
tural and historical context in which it is located. The result of 
that synthesis is that Professor Paulsen's proposed precedent-
limiting statute is clearly unconstitutional; Congress may not by 
statute tell the federal courts whether or in what way to use 
precedent. 16 
I do not reach that conclusion because of any great fondness 
for the doctrine of stare decisis. As Professor Paulsen notes, 17 he 
and I are among the tiny handful of academics who think it is af-
firmatively unconstitutional for federal courts to rely on prece-
dent in constitutional cases. 18 Nonetheless, Congress does not 
15. See generally Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of 
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267 
(1993) (arguing that the word "proper" in the text of the Sweeping Clause requires exer-
cises of federal power to be consistent with principles of federalism, separation of pow-
ers, and individual rights). 
16. I concentrate on Professor Paulsen rather than Professor Harrison because the 
former's proposal is more specific and far-ranging. Professor Harrison's characteristi-
cally insightful analysis is primarily concerned with identifying the sources and status of 
rules of precedent. The resolution of our dispute probably requires addressing some 
complex questions about the nature of decisionmaking that cannot be pursued here. Sec 
note 58. My criticism of Professor Paulsen's proposed statute applies as well to Nick 
Rosencranz's ingenious suggestion for a Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation that 
would, under congressional direction, regularize the process of statutory interpretation in 
federal courts. See Nick Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
(manuscript of Sept. 15, 2001 on file with the author). 
17. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1548 n.38 (cited in note 12). 
18. See generally Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 23 (1994) (analogizing Marbury's reasoning supporting the consti-
tutional case in favor of judicial review to the constitutional case against federal courts 
using horizontal precedent to decide constitutional issues). 
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have the power to tell the federal courts how to go about their 
business of deciding cases, even if the courts' own methods for 
deciding cases (such as reliance on precedent) are unconstitution-
ally wrong. This does not mean that the federal courts' use of 
precedent or other decision-making methodologies is therefore 
uncontrollable. To the contrary, the Constitution prescribes two 
very important, and very powerful, methods for controlling the 
actions of the federal courts. But the enactment of a congres-
sional statute along Professor Paulsen's lines is not one of them. 
Part I of this article briefly explores some preliminary 
methodological matters that are essential for a proper under-
standing of this issue. Part II describes more carefully the scope 
and limits of congressional power over the affairs of the federal 
courts and explains why Professor Paulsen's proposed statute 
exceeds those limits. Part III applies that analysis to some of the 
existing statutes- several with very impressive pedigrees- that 
currently regulate the decision-making practices of the federal 
courts. Part IV then briefly sets forth the two constitutionally 
permissible methods for controlling the decision-making meth-
odologies of the federal courts. 
I 
Five preliminary points set the framework for a correct un-
derstanding of congressional power to regulate the affairs of the 
federal courts. First, this article seeks to determine the original 
meaning of the various clauses in the Constitution that define 
and limit the power of Congress to regulate judicial decision-
making. Under my strict originalist approach (which is markedly 
stricter than the approach employed by most originalists), the 
search for original meaning is precisely that: it is not a search for 
explanations or justifications of current or past doctrine. Court 
decisions and legislative and executive practices are neither con-
stitutive nor generally good evidence of constitutional meaning, 
and I treat them accordingly. Moreover, I make no normative 
claims about the extent to which original meaning should guide 
decisions. Originalism, as I apply it here, is a theory of interpre-
tation, not a theory of adjudication. 19 What people do with the 
Constitution's meaning once they have it is their own business. 
19. For a deeper exploration of the crucial difference between interpretation and 
adjudication. and the decidedly contingent links between them, sec generally Gary Law-
son, On Reading Recipes ... and Constitutions, 85 Georgetown L.J. 1823 (1997). 
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Although the participants in this debate have a substantial 
range of methodological disagreements, they share enough 
common premises to let the game proceed without a more ex-
tensive discussion of methodology (though I will address some 
fine points along the way). Professors Paulsen and Harrison 
both employ some variant of originalism, though the latter's 
variant may be a bit more eclectic than mine. Professor Redish 
styles himself a nonoriginalist textualist, and Professor Engdahl's 
methodology, as with most of his work, defies easy classifica-
tion.20 On structural issues, however, Professors Redish and 
Engdahl strongly emphasize the central role of the original writ-
ten text and the inferences that are fairly drawn from it. While 
one could perhaps imagine serious differences emerging be-
tween originalist and nonoriginalist textualists on structural mat-
ters- if, for example, the nonoriginalists adopted some kind of 
evolutionary theory of departmental powers-in practice those 
differences have proved to be relatively small.21 Accordingly, I 
can (and do) take for granted some basic premises about 
originalist methodology as applied to structural issues. That may 
change, of course, if someone enters this debate from a widely 
20. For Professor Redish, any interpretation of the Constitution must be consistent 
with the document's language and overall structure, though he rejects strict reliance on 
founding-era understandings. See Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure at 6-16 
(cited in note 7); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the 
Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 673, 679-82 (1999). Of 
course, most modern originalists also reject any strict reliance on direct historical evi-
dence of founding-era beliefs. The ultimate originalist inquiry is hypothetical: what 
would a fully informed public at the time of ratification, knowing everything that there is 
to know about the Constitution and the world around it, have understood a particular 
term or clause to mean? Too great a focus on actual historical understandings can cloud 
this inquiry; one must always be prepared to ask whether an expressed understanding 
would have been different had the utterer known or thought about X, Y, and z. Profes-
sor Redish may have more in common with originalists than he realizes, though to pursue 
this would take us far afield. For a brief self-description of Professor Engdahl's distinc-
tive methodology, see David E. Engdahl, What's in a Name? The Constitutionality of 
Multiple "Supreme" Courts, 66 Ind. L. Rev. 457,504-10 (1991). 
21. The differences are small because Professors Redish and Engdahl do not seek 
to superimpose on the Constitution's structural design some theory of government radi-
cally different from that embodied in the original document. Accordingly, the inferences 
that they draw from the constitutional structure are not grossly different from the infer-
ences that would be drawn by a strict originalist. The gap between originalists and Pro-
fessors Redish and Engdahl could be much larger on other issues in which, for example, 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment plays a central role. Professors Redish and 
Engdahl also depart significantly from an originalist understanding of the scope of Con-
gress' powers under the Commerce Oause and Sweeping Oause, but that may reflect 
more a difference in application than in underlying methodology. 
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divergent perspective, but there will be time enough to address 
those concerns if and when it becomes necessary.22 
Second, it is important to be clear on exactly which clauses 
of the Constitution are relevant to this inquiry. Apart from the 
Appointments Clause, which enables the federal courts to re-
ceive from Congress the power to appoint inferior federal offi-
cers,23 there is only one clause of the Constitution that confers 
power on the federal courts to act: the Article III Vesting 
Clause, which provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish."24 Other clauses define the classes of disputes in which this 
power may be exercised25 or require the use of certain practices 
and procedures,26 but the Vesting Clause is the Constitution's 
sole affirmative want of power to the federal courts to act in a 
judicial capacity. 
Similarly, there is only one clause of the Constitution (apart 
from the Appointments Clause) that empowers Congress to 
regulate the affairs of the judicial department: the Sweeping 
Clause, which provides that Congress shall have power "[t]o 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. "28 This conclu-
sion will seem strange to many contemporary observers-
including many who hold federal judicial commissions. Courts 
and scholars have long assumed that Congress' gower "[to] con-
stitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" 9 carries with it, 
22. Of course, there really won't be time enough to do so then. Before one gets to 
the relative merits of originalism and other interpretative approaches, one must be able 
to define precisely what an originalist (or any other) inquiry entails. Even to identify the 
relevant questions for such a project would require a book (which I am planning), though 
a few of those questions unavoidably surface below. For some very preliminary thoughts 
on the mechanics of originalism, see Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The 
President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541,550-59 (1994); see also Mark D. 
Greenberg and Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 Georgetown L.J. 
569 (1998); Lawson, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 1823-1836 (cited in note 19). 
23. Sec U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
24. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
25. See U.S. Const., Art. III,§ 2, cis. 1-2. 
26. See Gary Lawson and Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1273 n.l8 (1996). 
27. For a definitive discussion of this point, see generally Steven G. Calabresi, The 
Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1377 (1994). 
28. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, cl. 18. 
29. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, cl. 9. 
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by implication, some measure of power to regulate the affairs of 
those inferior courts.30 Professor Engdahl, however, has recently 
demonstrated that the Tribunals Clause and the Sweeping 
Clause mean exactly what they say. The former gives Congress 
power to create inferior courts, while the latter gives Congress 
power to regulate the affairs of those courts (and the Supreme 
Court as well). 31 It is unnecessary to rehearse here Professor 
Engdahl's structural and historical arguments, because the con-
clusion emerges upon careful reflection. The Tribunals Clause 
no more carries with it implicit powers than does the Bankruptcy 
Clause32 or the Postal Roads Clause.33 The Sweeping Clause is 
the explicit textual source of Congress' power to pass ancillary 
legislation "for carrying into Execution" any constitutionally 
granted powers. The reference in the Sweeping Clause to "all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof," 
which clearly includes the "judicial Power" vested in the federal 
courts, makes it clear beyond cavil that the Sweeping Clause is 
the specific textual vehicle for congressional legislation with re-
spect to the operations of the judicial department. And because 
the Sweeping Clause is the source of congressional power in this 
area, that clause also defines the scope and limits of Congress' 
power. 
Third, the Sweeping Clause contains two important limita-
tions on the scope of its granted power. As Professor Engdahl 
emphasizes, any laws enacted by Congress to regulate the affairs 
of a coordinate department34 must be "for carrying into Execu-
30. Similarly, the assumption has long been that Congress acquires some measure 
of power over the Supreme Court's jurisdiction from the clause declaring that the Su-
preme Court "shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Ex-
ceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. Canst., Art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 2. 
31. See Engdahl, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 104-19 (cited in note 1). Similarly, in a 
discussion that ought to have a seismic impact on federal courts scholarship, Professor 
Engdahl elegantly demonstrates that the exceptions clause refers to a congressional 
power to regulate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction but does not confer that 
power. See id. at 119-32. Note that the conventional account, which locates congres-
sional power to regulate judicial affairs in the Tribunals Oause, only generates congres-
sional power over the lower federal courts. By contrast, whatever power Congress de-
rives from the Sweeping Clause extends as well to the Supreme Court. Anyone who is 
skeptical that such long-established understandings could be so thoroughly undermined 
by a modem law review article should consider this a challenge to rebut Professor Eng-
dahl's claims on the basis of original meaning. 
32. See U.S. Canst., Art. I,§ 8, cl. 4. 
33. See U.S. Canst., Art. I,§ 8, cl. 7. 
34. Pursuant to my obsession with the terminology of the founding generation: The 
founders almost uniformly used the term "departments" to refer to the legislative, execu-
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tion" the powers vested in that department. Moreover, any law 
for carrying into execution federal powers must be "necessary 
and proper" for that purpose. A law is "necessary" if it bears a 
suitable causal relationship to the end in question; how close a 
"fit" between means and ends this requires is a matter of consid-
erable controversy.35 For present purposes, however, the more 
important term in the Sweeping Clause is the word "proper." 
Patricia B. Granger and I have elsewhere explored at consider-
able length the original meaning of the word "proper" in the 
Sweeping Clause.36 In brief, a "proper" executory law must con-
form to the Constitution's terms and design, including the back-
ground norms of federalism, separation of powers, and individ-
ual rights that underlie the document. A statute that trenches on 
prerogatives that (for want of a better word) properly belong to 
another department or institution is improper and therefore be-
yond Congress' enumerated powers.37 
Fourth, the centrality of the Sweeping Clause to this inquiry 
has important methodological implications. Professor Paulsen is 
skeptical of the use of abstract conceptions of separation of 
powers as a tool of constitutional interpretation, objecting that 
"[t]here is no freestanding 'Separation of Powers Clause' that 
contains its own statute-invalidating set of rules or standards; 
there is only the collection of texts that make up the system."38 
That is not entirely right. The Sweeping Clause is precisely (in 
part) just such a "Separation of Powers Clause." Professor 
Paulsen is correct that the Constitution adopts a specific, 
blended scheme for allocatin~ governmental power rather than 
some pure theoretical model 9 and that one must be careful to 
tive, and judicial institutions of the national government, reserving the term "branches" 
for the different houses of the legislative department. See Steven G. Calabresi and 
Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 
Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1156 n.6 (1992). 
35. Compare Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 745 
(1997) (urging a strict interpretation of necessity) with Lawson and Granger, 43 Duke 
L.J. at 286-89 (cited in note 15) (intimating that Chief Justice Marshall may have been 
right in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), to offer a more generous 
account of necessity). 
36. See Lawson and Granger, 43 Duke L.J. at 291-297 (cited in note 15). 
37. All of the relevant inquiries under the Sweeping Clause arc objective; the Con-
stitution does not commit interpretation of the Sweeping Clause exclusively to Congress. 
Sec id. at 276-85. 
38. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1582 n.121 (cited in note 12). 
39. See generally Arnold I. Burns and Stephen J. Markman, Understanding Separa-
tion of Powers, 7 Pace L. Rev. 575 (1987) (rejecting abstract separation of powers theo-
ries and arguing for a strict textualist interpretation of the Constitution when analyzing 
separation of powers issues). 
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avoid reading overly general conceptions of separation of pow-
ers into the Constitution. But there is simply no way to under-
stand, for example, the "executive" and "judicial" powers or the 
scope of congressional authority to regulate the execution of 
these powers without reference to theoretical background norms 
about the Constitution's separation of powers. One can criticize 
particular conclusions about how broadly or narrowly the back-
ground separation-of-powers norms cut, but that does not mean 
that some such norms do not operate at a constitutional level. 
Nor are such norms "freestanding." A "proper" separation of 
powers argument is as fully textual as is, for example, an argu-
ment about the meaning of the word "officer" in the Appoint-
ments Clause.40 
The fifth, and final, preliminary point concerns the practical 
and historical context of the debate concerning congressional 
power over judicial affairs. Professor Paulsen devotes much of 
his analysis to a demonstration that his proposed precedent-
restricting statute is consistent with long-established doctrinal 
understandings about congressional power to regulate the judi-
cial process.41 He is entirely right about this. Congress routinely 
regulates the manner in which courts decide cases, from choice-
of-law rules to rules of evidence to standards of review. A 
conclusion that Congress cannot forbid certain uses of precedent 
does indeed call into question many of these long-held assump-
tions about congressional power and is clearly more radical in its 
implications than Professor Paulsen's proposal, which requires at 
most a very modest extension of well-settled law. Professor 
Paulsen has history, practice, and doctrine on his side. Indeed, 
he has everything except the Constitution. 
40. See U.S. Canst., Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. But if one must discern background under-
standings in order to determine the contours of a "proper" approach to separation of 
powers, federalism, and individual rights, what textual work does the Sweeping Clause 
perform? See Lawrence Lessig, Trans/acing Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 S. 
Ct. Rev. 125, 201 (raising this objection in connection with "proper" principles of federal-
ism). That is a separate topic, but the short answer is threefold. First, the Sweeping 
Clause gives these background principles textual grounding, if one cares about such 
things (as Professor Paulsen and I do). It is, as Professor Paulsen intimates, more diffi-
cult to claim constitutional status for a free-standing norm than to use such norms to in-
terpret language that is well structured to receive them. Second, channeling the inquiry 
through a text shapes the inquiry into the appropriate background norms. Third, if the 
Sweeping Clause is the primary vehicle through which these norms arc constitutional-
ized, then the norms may not apply (or may not apply in the same way) to legislation en-
acted pursuant to the District or Territories/Property Clauses or by direct exercises of the 
other Article I, Section 8 powers. For more discussion of my obsession with the Sweep-
ing Clause, see notes 74-75. 
41. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1582-90 (cited in note 12). 
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II 
Start with some easy cases. Congress clearly has the power 
to affect the process of judicial decision-making in many ways. 
Courts, for example, must apply valid congressional statutes as 
substantive law in cases to which they apply and even give them 
preference over many other sources of substantive law with 
which they may conflict.42 What else could "legislative Powers" 
possibly mean? Thus, whenever it enacts a substantive statute, 
Congress controls to some extent-and possibly to a dispositive 
extent-how courts will decide cases. 
It is just as clear, however, that Congress cannot enact a 
statute instructing a federal court to decide a specific case in a 
specific wa,x- Everyone, including Professor Paulsen, agrees with 
this much. 3 Nor could Congress pass a general statute provid-
ing, for example, that in any case raising a question concerning 
the constitutionality of a statute restricting abortion, the court 
must rule for/against the plaintiff. 
Why not? Why can't Congress tell the federal courts how to 
decide specific cases, or classes of cases, given that Congress has 
the undoubted power to determine to a large extent the substan-
tive law that courts must apply? Perhaps discovering the true 
reasons for the obvious can help us analyze the non-obvious. 
One wrong turn is to say that such an outcome-directing 
statute would violate the Fifth Amendment by depriving the los-
ing party of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law,"44 because due process of law requires a fair chance to win 
in an impartial forum. This is right as far as it goes, but it does 
not go far enough. It would mean that if the interests at stake in 
the case were not "life, liberty, or property," then Congress 
could direct the outcome even in a particular case.45 Further-
more, it would mean that Congress only lost the power to direct 
case outcomes in 1791, when the Fifth Amendment was ratified. 
Neither conclusion is unthinkable, but both are odd enough to 
give one pause. 
42. See U.S. Canst., Art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land"). 
43. Sec Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1568 (cited in note 12). Sec also United States v. 
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). 
44. U.S. Canst., Amend. V. 
45. Sec Redish, 46 Mercer L. Rev. at 709 (cited in note 5). 
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The Due Process Clause is simply the wrong place to look 
for answers to these kinds of problems. The Bill of Rights today 
is usually the first resort for a limitation on congressional power 
when, as an original matter, it should be second in line. The 
Constitution limits the power of federal institutions primarily 
through the scheme of enumerated powers. The Bill of Rights in 
1791 did not significantly alter the legal landscape; it merely 
clarified, and to a very limited extent expanded, the range of 
limitations on the federal government that was already part of 
the constitutional design in 1789.46 Outside of federal territories 
and enclaves, very few statutes were constitutional in 1790 but 
unconstitutional in 1792. 
Instead of running to the Due Process Clause, we should 
first look to the scheme of enumerated powers. The place to be-
gin an inquiry concerning the powers of the federal judiciary is 
with the enumerated powers-or, more precisely, the enumer-
ated power-of the federal judiciary. The only clause that af-
firmatively empowers the federal judiciary to act in a judicial ca-
pacity is the Vesting Clause of Article III, which states that 
"[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish. "47 Any power exercised 
by a federal court must stem either from this grant of the "judi-
cial Power" or from a federal statute that is "necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution" the judicial power. 
Historical research tells us almost nothing about what this 
"judicial Power" was likely to be understood to entail in 1789.48 
Professor Paulsen notes, for example, that the claim that the ju-
dicial power "includes the power to vest precedent with authori-
tative, decision-altering weight, independent of its persuasive-
ness"49 was not made "by anyone in the Constitutional 
Convention; nor by any prominent (or even obscure) framer or 
ratifier at the time of the drafting, debate over, and early imple-
mentation of the Constitution; nor even by any prominent oppo-
46. For an elaboration of this point, see Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an Ex-
clamation Point, 33 U. Richmond L. Rev. 511 (1999) (asserting that the original Constitu-
tion and not the Bill of Rights is the proper primary vehicle for determining the permis-
sible scope of government action and individual rights). 
47. U.S. Canst., Art. III,§ 1. 
48. Lest one lose focus, one must always remember that originalism is a search for 
hypothetical rather than actual historical understanding. See note 20. But history is not 
irrelevant; it is generally hard to determine what a hypothetical audience would have 
thought without reference to what real audiences actually thought. 
49. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1571 (cited in note 12). 
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nent in the ratification debates or Anti-Federalist literature."50 
This is not a surprising conclusion; one could say the same about 
virtually every proposition concerning the meaning of the "judi-
cial Power." "The judicial Power" simply was not a term that 
received serious attention during the founding period.51 Nor 
does the silence necessarily reflect consensus. The "judicial 
Power" in 1789 was not a term with a lengthy, well-understood 
history. Indeed, the notion of "judicial Power" as a distinct as-
pect of governmental power, rather than as a manifestation of 
legislative or executive power, was a relatively recent innovation 
in the late eighteenth century.52 
About all that we can say with certainty about the "judicial 
Power" is that it is the power to decide cases in accordance with 
governing law.53 But why isn't a law that directs the outcome in 
a case part of that governing law? After all, to say that courts 
have the power to decide cases is not necessarily to say that no 
other institution can guide, or even direct, that power. The Con-
stitution does not expressly say that "no other Institution of the 
federal Government shall instruct the Courts in their Exercise of 
the judicial Power." Indeed, the Sweeping Clause provides su-
perficially plausible grounds for claiming the contrary. 
The reason that Congress cannot direct the outcome in a 
particular case (or class of cases) is that such a law would not be 
"necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the judicial 
50. Id. I assume that Professor Paulsen was as unimpressed as was I by the recent 
attempt by an Eighth Circuit panel to ground precedent in the Constitution's original 
meaning. See Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding unconsti-
tutional a rule forbidding precedential reliance on unpublished opinions), vac'd as moot 
on reh'g en bane, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Richard H. Fallon, Stare Decisis 
and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 
578-82 (2001) (offering a perfunctory originalist defense of stare decisis). 
51. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1272-74 (cited in note 26). Mr. 
Moore spent a good portion of his third year of law school looking for direct historical 
sources concerning the meaning of the "judicial Power," and neither he nor I came up 
with anything interesting. Others who have undertaken the quest have fared little better. 
See generally James S. Liebman and William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The 
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking required of Article Ill Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 
696 (1998). Professor Liebman and Mr. Ryan, however, have demonstrated that the 
sparse sources that exist tend to support an inference of decisional independence. See 
notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
52. See Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure at 103-05 (cited in note 7) 
(discussing pre-American conceptions of separated powers that did not include the judi-
cial power as a distinct governmental function). For an intriguing discussion of early 
eighteenth-century linkages between legislative and judicial powers, see generally Chris-
tine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early 
American Tradition, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1381 (1998). 
53. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1273 (cited in note 26). 
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power. It probably fails even a generous test of necessity. And 
it would not be "proper" because it would violate a constitu-
tional background norm that says that each department of the 
national government must be independent of the other depart-
ments in its exercise of enumerated functions unless the Consti-
tution directs otherwise.54 That principle, in turn, is gleaned 
from our best understanding of what a fully informed public in 
1789 would have regarded as a "proper" scheme of separated 
powers in the context of the Constitution. 
Where the text of the Constitution directs a particular allo-
cation of governmental power, that allocation must be re-
spected-even when that allocation violates pure theoretical 
conceptions of separated powers (as is arguably the case, for ex-
ample, with the Presentment Clause of article I, section 7, which 
gives the executive a direct role in the legislative process). But 
what happens when the text is silent? One possible answer is 
that the Sweeping Clause gives Congress authority to fill in all 
gaps without limitation.55 Another possible answer, however, is 
that there are certain background principles that define the 
"proper" allocation of powers in the absence of direct constitu-
tional specification. The latter answer is overwhelmingly more 
plausible. The whole point of vesting three distinct kinds of gov-
ernmental power in three distinct institutions is to create inde-
pendent power centers. Just as the vesting clauses generate a 
principle of departmental coordinacy, under which each depart-
ment has a distinct obligation to construe the laws and Constitu-
tion,56 they also generate a principle of departmental independ-
ence, under which each department should be understood to 
operate outside the direct control of other departments unless 
the Constitution instructs to the contrary. This principle of de-
partmental independence is, at a minimum, a good starting 
point for determining whether a statutory allocation of power is 
54. One could also try to say that such a law would not really be "for carrying into 
Execution" the judicial power. That assumes, however, that the judicial power includes 
an independent power to reach legal conclusions without legislative direction, which is 
precisely the proposition about to be established. Once one has established that proposi-
tion, the requirement that executory laws actually carry the judicial power into execution 
begins to have bite. 
55. Peter Strauss has come very close to endorsing this position on occasion. See 
Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-
A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488,492-93 (1987). 
56. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to 
Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L.J. 217, 228-29 (1994). 
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constitutionally "proper" when the Constitution is otherwise si-
lent. 
The case for this principle of decisional independence, as 
Professor Redish aptly terms it,57 is very strong. I have else-
where, in conjunction with Christopher D. Moore, defended at 
length the proposition that federal courts, in the exercise of their 
power of constitutional review, are generally not obliged to give 
deference to the constitutional views of Congress or the Presi-
dent.58 Many of those arguments support the additional proposi-
tion that Congress cannot alter that background principle by or-
dinary legislation pursuant to the Sweeping Clause. 
First, "all three departments of the national government are 
equally created by the Constitution, are 'coequal in title and 
rank as representatives of the People,' and all owe allegiance 
first and foremost to the Constitution that empowers them. "59 
This postulate of coordinacy most reasonably entails a principle 
of decisional independence among the departments, especially as 
no department is expressly granted a power of constitutional in-
terpretation but all three departments possess such power by 
implication from other granted powers. It would be exceedingly 
odd (even though not entirely unthinkable) if Congress could 
undo this structural coordinacy by a simple statute. 
Second, one of the obvious purposes of the Constitution's 
intricate scheme of separated powers "is to ensure that govern-
ment action generally takes place only when distinct actors with 
distinct roles and functions all agree that the action is permissi-
ble."60 Interpretative independence is a natural corollary of this 
57. Sec Redish, 46 Mercer L. Rev. at 699 (cited in note 5). 
58. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1274-79 (cited in note 26). I have 
similarly argued that the President is generally not bound by the views of Congress or the 
courts. See Gary Lawson, Everything I Need to Know About Presidents I Learned From 
Dr. Seuss, 24 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 381 (2001). There are important exceptions to this 
general principle of interpretative independence. Most importantly, one must distinguish 
between legal deference, which gives weight to the views of another actor simply because 
of that actor's status, and epistemological deference, which gives weight to the views of 
another actor because there are reasons to believe that that actor's views are good evi-
dence of the right answer. Epistemological deference can shade into legal deference if an 
actor's status is, by itself, reason enough to think that the actor is more likely than the 
court to get the right answer. For a more elaborate discussion of legal and epistemologi-
cal deference, see Lawson & Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1277-79, 1300 (cited in note 26). 
The distinction between legal and epistemological deference probably underlies 
most of my disagreements with Professor Harrison on this topic, but that would require a 
separate article to explore. 
59. Id. at 1275-76 (quoting Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 229) (cited in note 56)). 
60. Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1276 (cited in note 26). There are times, 
of course, when the Constitution expressly permits action by fewer than three depart-
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constitutional scheme of divided powers. It would be exceed-
ingly odd (even though not entirely unthinkable) if Congress 
could undo this structural requirement of departmental consen-
sus by a simple statute. 
Third, at least in a case in which Congress' own power is at 
issue, allowing Congress to dictate the outcome of the case 
would permit Congress to be the judge in its own cause.61 This 
would violate one of the most venerable precepts in Anglo-
American law,62 which makes it an unlikely (though not impos-
sible) candidate for a "proper" eighteenth-century understand-
ing of Congress' powers. More pointedly, "the Constitution on a 
few occasions specifically and expressly makes certain actors the 
judges of the scope of their powers."63 The best inference is that 
those express grants are exceptions from the normal rule of de-
partmental coordinacy and independence. It would be exceed-
ingly odd (even though not entirely unthinkable) if Congress 
could undo this careful allocation of interpretative authority by a 
simple statute. 
Fourth, a specific proposal to permit Congress to regulate 
the manner in which federal courts decide cases was rejected by 
the Constitutional Convention. By a six-to-two vote, the Con-
vention defeated a provision that would have provided that, in 
all cases outside the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, "the 
judicial power shall be exercised in such manner as the Legisla-
ture shall direct."64 The rejection of this proposal, which pre-
served "the otherwise constitutionally sacrosanct quality of fed-
eral judging,"65 supports the principle of decisional 
. d d 66 m epen ence. 
ments. The President, for example, has nothing to say about the House or Senate's selec-
tion of their own officers. See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representa-
tives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers"); U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 3, cl. 4 ("The 
Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate"); U.S. Const., Art. I, 
§ 3, cl. 5 ("The Senate shall chuse their other Officers"). Whether the courts have any 
role in that process is a tale for another time. 
61. Sec Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1276-77 (cited in note 26). 
62. See id. at 1276. 
63. Id. For discussion of these clauses, see Lawson and Granger, 43 Duke L.J. at 
277-78 (cited in note 15). 
64. Max Farrand, ed., 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 425 (Yale 
U. Press 1911). 
65. Liebman and Ryan, 98 Colum. L. Rev. at 754 n.271 (cited in note 51). 
66. See id. How strongly it supports the principle depends on how much weight 
one wants to assign to this kind of Convention maneuvering and how confidently one can 
trust the historical records. The short answers are, respectively, "not that much" and 
"tolerably well when the result coheres with other sources." On the latter point, see gen-
erally James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documen-
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None of these (or other related) propositions about the 
Constitution, separation of powers, or the Sweeping Clause can 
be absolutely demonstrated by smoking-gun evidence, but all of 
them, based on our best inferences about the scheme of the Con-
stitution, are knowable with a high degree of confidence. Pro-
fessor Redish is entirely right to glean a principle of "decisional 
independence" for the federal courts as a background norm that 
helps define the "proper" separation of powers. The Constitu-
tion gives the federal judiciary the power to decide cases in ac-
cordance with governing law, and Congress cannot direct the ex-
ercise of that power under the guise of the Sweeping Clause. 
What if the substantive law does not directly command a 
decision for one party but is so narrowly tailored that it effec-
tively prescribes the outcome for a pending case or ongoing con-
troversy? This is a swamp that I had hoped to avoid until a sub-
sequent article, but two commentators on this manuscript have 
pushed me into it here. 
The nondelegation doctrine, in its originalist form, limits the 
extent to which statutes can leave important issues unresolved.67 
Does the Constitution also impose a maximum as well as a 
minimum degree of specificity on regulator~ statutes? The Con-
stitution's prohibitions on bills of attainder 8 forbid one form of 
specificity, but is there a broader constitutional rule against stat-
utes that, in effect, control the outcome of court proceedings?69 
The classic case is State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont 
Bridge Company. 70 The Court had previously held that a par-
ticular bridge over the Ohio River was enjoinable as a nuisance 
because of its potential to obstruct navigation. 71 Congress re-
sponded with a statute declaring "[t]hat the bridges across the 
Ohio River at Wheeling, in the State of Virginia, and at Bridge-
tary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1986) (discussing problems with the reliability of found-
ing-era sources); Lawson and Granger, 43 Duke L.J. at 334-35 (cited in note 15) (defend-
ing certain limited uses of these sources despite their potential inaccuracy). 
67. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev._ (2002) 
(forthcoming). 
68. U.S. Canst., Art. I,§ 9, cl. 3; U.S. Canst., Art. I,§ 10, cl. 1. 
69. Pure appropriations measures, most notably private bills, are often quite spe-
cific. Those statutes do not raise concerns relevant to this article because they do not 
normally prescribe judicial outcomes. The particular specificity problem that I am ad-
dressing here concerns the relationship between the legislative and judicial departments. 
Whether there might be similar problems in the relationship between the legislative and 
executive departments is yet another matter. 
70. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855). 
71. See State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 
How.) 518 (1851). 
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port, in the State of Ohio, abutting on Zane's Island, in said 
river, are hereby declared to be lawful structures in their present 
position and elevation, and shall be so held and taken to be, any, 
thing in the law or laws of the United States to the contrary not-
withstanding."72 In a suit to lift the injunction to permit con-
struction of a new bridge with essentially the same dimensions as 
the old one, a divided Court applied the statute and accordingly 
lifted the injunction. Was this an impermissible congressional 
attempt to control the judicial process, akin to a statute saying 
"Decide a motion for termination of the injunction in favor of 
the Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company"? 
In terms of effect, the statute declaring the bridges to be 
lawful was pretty clearly the same as a statute declaring the 
company the advance winner of a subsequent lawsuit for termi-
nation of the injunction; the bridge was only a continuing nui-
sance if it was in fact an obstacle to navigation, and the congres-
sional statute purported to determine that fact. Congress clearly 
could have passed a general statute defining the criteria for ob-
structions to navigation (thereby preempting contrary state or 
general tort law). Congress just as clearly could not have simply 
declared the bridge company to be the winner in the upcoming 
litigation. On which line does the actual statute in Wheeling 
Bridge fall? It is not sufficient to say that upholding the law 
would elevate form over substance.73 That is clearly true, but for 
originalists, form often matters as much or more than substance. 
Many statutes effectively preordain the outcomes of litigation; 
there is little point in passing the statutes if they do not. 
I do not propose to resolve these issues here (though I hope 
to resolve them in the future as part of a larger study of the Con-
stitution's rules for statutory form and generality). For now, I 
make just one observation about the inquiry. If the Constitution 
contains a rule about the extent to which statutes either must or 
must not resolve issues for litigation, the rule must stem from the 
Sweeping Clause; there is no other text at hand to do the trick. 74 
72. Act of Aug. 31, 1852 § 6, 10 Stat. 110, 112 (1852). Section 7 of the statute fur-
ther declared the bridges to be post roads, but the Court avoided basing its decision on 
this designation. 
73. See Sager, 86 Georgetown. L.J. at 2526-27 (cited in note 8). 
74. Why can't one simply say that the principle of decisional independence is part 
of the "judicial Power" (and the "executive Power"), and thus limits Congress' authority, 
with or without reference to the Sweeping Clause? One probably can, but only up to a 
point. If there was a thick, well understood conception of the judicial power in the late 
eighteenth century, one could avoid most of these qu.est~ons simply by re~erence to that 
conception. But there was not, so any background pnnc1ples that do not fmd textual ex-
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Cases like Wheeling Bridge then pose a special puzzle. The stat-
ute in Wheeling Bridge was at least arguably a direct exercise of 
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce and not an 
executory law for implementing the commerce power. Can it 
really be the case that the Constitution imposes different rules of 
specificity (or generality) based on something as contingent as 
whether Congress can enact the statute in question without the 
Sweeping Clause? The answer is yes, which is why background 
principles of generality, such as the nondelegation doctrine and 
whatever specificity rule the Constitution may contain, do not 
apply to legislation under the District Clause or the Territo-
ries/Property Clause. 75 The same is true of legislation under the 
pression must operate at a fairly high level of generality. That poses the "Paulsen prob-
lem" of letting free-standing norms run amok. The Constitution is an "impure" com-
promise that is certainly based on understandings about separated powers but does not 
uniformly embody a single coherent theory. For example, the Presentment Clauses give 
the President some degree of legislative power, the President of the Senate Clause does 
the same for the Vice President, and the Appointments Clause gives courts some meas-
ure of the executive/legislative appointment power. More pointedly, the Sweeping 
Clause expressly authorizes Congress to legislate with respect to the other departments' 
powers. That express authorization limits the extent to which one can say that the very 
nature of the judicial and executive powers precludes legislative interference; the Consti-
tution quite obviously contemplates some measure of interference, regardless of what 
some "pure" theory might tell us. The question then becomes what degree of departure 
from purity the Constitution contemplates, and that question can only be answered by 
carefully examining the enumerated powers that permit interference. Perhaps one can 
derive a rule against direct legislative control of judicial (or executive) outcomes from 
the very existence of a scheme of separated powers, but any limitations on legislation 
that stray very far from that extreme probably need some "internal" constitutional 
grounding-even if those internal norms direct our attention to external understandings. 
Hence, the "necessary and proper" and "for carrying into Execution" requirements of 
the Sweeping Clause must play an essential role in structural constitutional analysis. 
75. This explains why Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), 
does not present the same problems as Wheeling Bridge. The statute at issue in Robert-
son, which essentially defined certain timber harvesting activities as compliant with ap-
plicable federal laws, regulated timber harvesting on federal lands and was thus an exer-
cise of the Property Clause power. Perhaps one can read a specificity requirement into 
that clause's authorization of "needful Rules and Regulations respecting the ... Property 
belonging to the United States," U.S. Const., Art. IV,§ 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added), but that 
is a much tougher task than finding such a requirement in the Sweeping Clause. 
Does this mean that Congress can prescribe judicial outcomes under the District or 
Territories/Property Clauses? (Such a statute clearly could not be a direct exercise of 
any of Congress' other powers.) The answer is a somewhat involved "no (or at least 
mostly no)." If one can simply rule out direct legislative control of judicial outcomes as 
inherent in a scheme of separated powers, see note 74, then the question is easy. If not, 
matters get complicated. Prior to 1791, the unqualified language of the District Clause 
arguably did permit Congress to control judicial outcomes, though such a statute proba-
bly would not have survived even the minimal requirement of needfulness under the Ter-
ritories/Property Clause. The ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 had some interest-
ing, and probably unintended, effects on Congress' power over the District, territories, 
and federal property. The first nine amendments extended some of the principles of lim-
ited government into the otherwise general legislative authority of Congress over these 
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other Article I, Section 8 powers, with this important difference: 
Congress almost never needs the Sweeping Clause to legislate 
for the District of Columbia, territories, or federal property, but 
it almost always needs the Sweeping Clause to effectuate its 
other powers. The statute in Wheeling Bridge, if it is truly an ex-
ercise of the commerce power, is one of the few examples of a 
self-contained, self-executing statute under the Commerce 
Clause. If a statute requires any penalty or enforcement provi-
sions, those provisions must be enacted pursuant to the Sweep-
ing Clause, and one must then ask whether it is "proper" to au-
thorize enforcement of a statute that violates norms of generality 
(if indeed the substantive statute does so). As for the other Ar-
ticle I, Section 8 powers: some of them seem to require by their 
terms some measure of generality,76 others contemplate highly 
specific legislation,77 and still others are ambiguous.78 A full 
study of this question thus requires a careful analysis of each of 
Congress' enumerated powers-which is one of the many rea-
sons that I do not want to say any more about it here. 
So Congress can (to an extent) provide the federal courts 
with substantive law but cannot directly command the outcome 
of a case. What about the identification of the relevant facts and 
law and the process of reasoning to a case outcome? Is that 
process of decision-making subject to congressional control by 
statute? 
The judicial power of course includes the power to reason to 
the outcome of a case. One cannot decide cases without bring-
ing to bear some decision-making methodology for identifying 
and applying the relevant facts and law, so a grant of the judicial 
power must include a grant of the power to reason from facts 
and law to conclusions. Can Congress control that reasoning 
power by using the Sweeping Clause to dictate the decision-
making methodology that courts must employ? The answer, as 
areas. To the extent that life, liberty, or property arc at stake in the litigation, the exten-
sion of due process principles to the District and territories might well forbid legislative 
control of judicial judgments. And in cases that do not involve life, liberty, or property, 
the question turns on whether one can fairly characterize the right to a judicial decision 
that is not predetermined as a "right[) ... retained by the people." U.S. Const., Amend. 
IX. 
76. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress "(t]o establish an uni-
form Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies through-
out the United States"). 
77. See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, cl. 7 (giving Congress power "(t]o establish Post Of-
fices and post Roads"). 
78. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (authorizing Congress "(t]o make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"). 
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an inference from the principle of departmental independence, 
must be no. The process of decision-making is so tied up with 
the process of reaching a decision that it must be the "proper" 
province of the judicial department in the same way and to the 
same degree as the power to reach an outcome. Indeed, it is al-
most silly to say that the core of the judicial power is merely the 
power to reach a result, without reference to the process by 
which that result is reached. Accordingly, Congress can pass 
substantive laws, but it cannot tell the courts how to identify, 
construe, and apply them. And because we are dealing with a 
simple absence of congressional power, the purported justifica-
tion for the exercise of the power is irrelevant. Even if the 
courts are applying a wrongheaded, or even unconstitutionally 
wrongheaded, method of decision-making, the Sweeping Clause 
does not empower Congress to prescribe a different process. 
This conclusion straightforwardly rules out a statute regulat-
ing the courts' use of precedent. The proof of any proposition, 
including propositions of law, requires three elements: principles 
of admissibility (what counts toward proving a proposition?), 
principles of significance (how much does the admissible evi-
dence count?), and standards of proof (how much evidence is 
needed to establish the truth of the proposition?).79 Each ele-
ment is essential to the disposition of any legal question, and 
congressional regulation of any element therefore violates the 
principle of departmental independence and is thus not 
"proper." This rules out statutes concerning the selection of ma-
terials for consideration (principles of legal admissibility), stat-
utes concerning the weight or relevance to be given to various 
materials (principles of significance) or statutes concerning the 
amount of proof needed, either at trial or on appeal, to establish 
the legal truth of a proposition (standards of proof). Professor 
Paulsen's proposed statute squarely regulates both the admissi-
bility and significance of precedent in judicial decision-making 
and is therefore unconstitutional. And that is true even if Con-
gress is right and the courts are wrong about how best to decide 
cases. 
Professor Paulsen's case against this "structural argument," 
as he aptly terms it, is as elegantly simple as the argument itself: 
(1) unless the Constitution prescribes a specific methodology, 
such as a specific method for assigning weight to precedent, the 
79. Sec generally Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 859 (1992) 
(discussing the structure of propositional proof). 
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choice of a methodology is ultimately a judgment of policy, and 
judge-made policies cannot prevail over congressional statutes, 
(2) the structural argument leads to an unchecked judiciary, 
which is "at odds with the Constitution's most fundamental 
structural postulate,"80 and (3) the structural argument is incon-
sistent with a wide range of doctrinal understandings, including 
some from the founding era. In Part IV of this article, I will 
demonstrate that proposition (2) is incorrect. Proposition (3) is 
correct, but it is relevant to this argument only to the extent that 
it bears on original meaning. In Part III, I will show that Profes-
sor Paulsen's doctrinal examples say little about original mean-
mg. 
The essence of Professor Paulsen's critique of the structural 
argument is therefore proposition (1), which is nicely summed 
up in the following passage: 
The [structural] argument claims the existence of penumbral 
judicial powers to prescribe rules of policy that trump the 
rules of law that the courts would otherwise find to be con-
tained in the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United 
States. Unless the argument is that the Constitution dictates a 
specific doctrine of stare decisis- and neither the courts nor 
any credible scholar has ever made such a claim, to my 
knowledge-the claim would have to be that the judiciary is 
constitutionally empowered to devise one of its own choosing, 
without limitation, by virtue of Article III's grant of "[ t ]he ju-
dicial Power" and the idea of separation of powers generally. 
That is pushing penumbras too far and misusing the idea of 
. f 81 separatiOn o powers. 
Apart from the last sentence, Professor Paulsen has it exactly 
right. The federal courts have precisely the power to choose de-
cision-making methodologies free of statutory control. If one 
wants to call that power "penumbral" rather than, say, "derived 
from background principles that define the 'proper' scope of 
Congress' power to legislate for other departments," so be it. 
And if one wants to call the prescription of decision-making 
methodologies a matter of "policy" rather than, say, "the deter-
mination of meta-norms for law-finding and fact-finding," so be 
that too. 
The stakes in this debate are quite high. Suppose that Con-
gress enacts a statute that says: "In deciding cases, the federal 
80. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1581 (cited in note 12). 
81. Id. at 1581-82. 
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courts may not consider any federal statute that is not cited by 
the parties in their briefs. In construing such statutes, the courts 
shall treat statements in congressional committee reports as con-
clusive evidence of statutory meaning [subject, perhaps, to cer-
tain rules for choosing among reports if there are inconsistent 
statements in different reports]." Is any part of this statute un-
constitutional? 
The first sentence determines the manner in which the 
courts must identify relevant federal statutory law. In the ab-
sence of such a statute, the courts would have to determine for 
themselves which of the numerous federal statutes on the books 
constitute relevant law for the cases before them. Can it be said 
that the Constitution prescribes a specific method for ascertain-
ing the relevant law? I doubt it. There may be certain methods 
that are clearly beyond the pale of the judicial power and there-
fore unconstitutional (such as picking relevant statutes by ran-
dom lot or astrological divination), but any assessment of rele-
vance requires an inescapable element of judgment and is 
therefore an unlikely candidate for codification, especially indi-
rect codification through a vesting of the "judicial Power." In 
that sense, the choice of a methodology for ascertaining the rele-
vant law would have to fall on Professor Paulsen's "nonconstitu-
tional policy" side of the ledger. 
The same can be said concerning the statute's second sen-
tence, which prescribes a method for determining statutory 
meaning. Even if one believes that the Constitution mandates 
an original public meaning approach to statutory interpretation, 
there are many different ways to identify and process evidence 
of that meaning. The choice among those methods, including 
how much weight to give to particular forms of legislative his-
tory, is surely a question of nonconstitutional policy, in Professor 
Paulsen's terms. 
Now consider some powers of the President under Article 
II -an analogy that Professor Paulsen briefly acknowledges.82 
The President has the power to execute the laws, including 
power to exercise a measure of enforcement discretion. The 
Constitution clearly does not mandate any one method for exer-
cising such discretion (though it places some methods out of 
bounds), so the selection of enforcement priorities is, within a 
very broad range, a matter of nonconstitutional policy. May 
82. See id. at 1579 n.119. 
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Congress therefore enact a statute providing, for example, "In 
exercising enforcement discretion under statute X, the President 
may not consider the extent to which prosecutions under this 
statute will burden resources for prosecutions under other stat-
utes"?83 
I am quite confident that Professor Paulsen would endorse a 
constitutional power in Congress to enact each of these statutes 
(or if he objected, the objection would involve the specific form 
or content of the statute and another could be drawn up that did 
not raise those concerns). I am equally persuaded that both 
statutes are "improper" and therefore unconstitutional. Our dif-
ference, quite bluntly, is that I believe that the Sweeping Clause 
is a textual vehicle for implementing the principle of departmen-
tal independence, while Professor Paulsen views such a principle 
as a free-floating abstraction without constitutional grounding. 
The ultimate question is therefore: who is right about the sweep 
of the Sweeping Clause with respect to congressional statutes af-
fecting the allocation of power among federal institutions? With 
all due respect, the case for departmental independence is at 
least as strong as the case for departmental coordinacy, which 
Professor Paulsen has developed so thoughtfully in his prior 
work. The principle of departmental independence is part of the 
"proper" allocation of powers under the federal Constitution. 
That principle entails an independent judicial power to ascertain, 
interpret, and apply the relevant law. Congress cannot tell 
courts how to reason any more than it can tell courts how to de-
cide. 
III 
Professor Paulsen's most compelling point is that a statute 
regulating the use of precedent is not very different (if it is dif-
ferent at all) from a host of statutes, many of ancient vintage, 
that seem to do precisely what the principle of decisional inde-
83. Professor Paulsen suggests that there may be a disanalogy between presidential 
powers under Article II and judicial powers under Article III if the "executive Power" by 
its nature contains an element of discretion that is not present in the "judicial Power." 
See id. at 1580 n.ll9. That is certainly true, but it has a boomerang effect on Professor 
Paulsen's argument. If the judiciary does not have discretion to choose decisionmaking 
methodologies under Article III, then the choice of a methodology must be a matter of 
constitutional command rather than of nonconstitutional policy, which undermines Pro-
fessor Paulsen's case for congressional power. In fact, however, there are inescapable 
elements of discretion under both Article II and Article III. There may be differences in 
the degree of discretion, but I doubt whether Professor Paulsen wants to draw constitu-
tional distinctions based on those differences in degree. 
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pendence flatly forbids. The point is entirely correct in its fac-
tual claims about modern practice, and it has bite from two di-
rections. First, if Congress has been regulating the judicial deci-
sion-making process since the start of the United States 
government, doesn't that tell us something important about the 
original understanding of the Sweeping Clause? Second, just 
how far does the principal of decisional independence cut? Does 
it mean that all of the numerous federal statutes invoked by Pro-
fessor Paulsen, from the Anti-Injunction Act to section 706 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, are unconstitutional? If the 
answer is yes, then the consequences of applying a principle of 
decisional independence would be quite extraordinary. 
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE 
The first question is the easiest to address. The numerous 
examples of congressional statutes offered by Professor Paulsen 
say little, if anything, about the original public understanding of 
the Sweeping Clause, even if we are to take early legislative en-
actments as good evidence of original public meaning. 84 
A great many congressional statutes currently regulate the 
standards of proof that courts must employ when deciding cer-
tain issues. The bulk of these statutes, such as Rule 52( a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,85 sections 706(2)(A) and 
706(2)(E) of the Administrative Procedure Act,86 and the nu-
merous organic statutes that prescribe a scope of review for ap-
peals from federal agency action,87 purport to mandate a defer-
ential standard of review to lower courts or administrative 
agencies, though Congress occasionally mandates a nondeferen-
84. Just how much such enactments should count in determining original public 
meaning is a question that can be answered only in the context of a detailed specification 
of the mechanics of a jurisprudence of original public meaning. For now, it is enough to 
note that they are surely admissible evidence, even if they ultimately prove to be of little 
significance. 
85. FRCP 52( a) (stating that findings of fact of federal district courts "shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous"). 
86. 5 U.S. C.§ 706(2)(A) & (E) (1994) ("[T]he reviewing court shall ... hold unlaw-
ful and set aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ... [or] (E) un-
supported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or 
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute"). 
87. Sec, for example, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1994) (directing courts to set aside conclu-
sions of the Merit Systems Protection Board if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ... or ... unsupported by substantial 
evidence"). 
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tial standard.88 These statutes are direct, profound regulations of 
the judicial decision-making process and thus directly challenge 
the principle of decisional independence. As far as original 
meaning is concerned, however, they are essentially irrelevant. 
All of these statutes are of distinctively modern origin and there-
fore, as indicia of original meaning, come "shrouded in an aura 
of incorrectness. "89 Enactments of early Congresses carry some 
weight concerning original meaning because the members of 
those bodies were part of the original public.90 As one gets far-
ther from the moment of framing, however, the reliability of 
subsequent generations of lawmakers goes down, and possibly 
quite dramatically. Certainly by the twentieth century, one 
would hardly view enactments of Congress as plausible indica-
tions of original constitutional meaning. And the statutes pre-
scribing standards of proof are essentially twentieth-century 
phenomena.91 
By contrast, the Rules of Decision Act, which declares that 
"[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution 
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise 
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil 
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where the.X 
apply,',n originated as section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 3 
The statute seems squarely to regulate the admissibility of legal 
materials and thus directly to control the decision-making proc-
ess. In fact, however, the Rules of Decision Act is not a regula-
tion of the judicial decision-making process because it does not 
create any new legal rule for courts to follow. The primary obli-
gation of courts is to decide cases in accordance with governing 
88. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1994) (prescribing de novo review for agency de-
terminations under the Freedom of Information Act). 
89. I owe this delicious phrase to Charles J. Cooper, in a conversation sometime in 
1985. Mr. Cooper was referring specifically to decisions of the Warren Court, but his 
assessment is easily generalizable to the twentieth-century constitutional world. 
90. The weight or significance of their views, of course, are blunted by their institu-
tional position in Congress. Members of Congress are not disinterested spectators on 
constitutional issues; their own powers, and those of their constitutional competitors, are 
on the line. Accordingly, enactments of early Congresses may be less reliable, rather 
than more reliable, indicators of original meaning than some other sources. 
91. The AP A, for example, was enacted in 1946, which was not a time distinguished 
by its fidelity to original meaning. The organic statutes that preceded the APA did not 
date from much earlier. For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the doc-
trine of deference to administrative agencies, see generally Gordon G. Young, Public 
Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 
35 Buffalo L. Rev. 765 (1986). 
92. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1994). 
93. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. 
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law. That necessarily requires a determination of which law 
governs. "The laws of the several states ... in cases where they 
apply" are clearly part of that governing law; if they apply, and if 
they are not preempted by a hierarchically superior source of 
law such as the Constitution or a federal statute or treaty, courts 
have an obligation to apply them. This obligation does not stem 
from, or even gain any force from, the Rules of Decision Act; it 
stems directly from the obligation to employ "[t]he judicial 
Power" of deciding cases in accordance with governing law. The 
Rules of Decision Act is an exhortation rather than a regulation, 
along the lines of "decide cases correctly" or "observe National 
Vinegar Month." It does not change the legal landscape-
beyond, perhaps, expressing a congressional sentiment against 
implied preemption of state law-and thus does not implicate 
the principle of decisional independence. This declaratory role 
was understood in the founding era, 94 and the Rules of Decision 
Act therefore does not reflect any underlying theory of the 
Sweeping Clause. 
Congress routinely legislates concerning the remedies that 
federal courts can employ. The most obvious example is the 
Anti-Injunction Act,95 which dates back to 1793.96 Professor 
Paulsen relies on this early example of congressional regulation 
as support for his broad reading of the Sweeping Clause.97 
When all is said and done, it may well be that the power to 
award a remedy is so bound up with the power to decide a case 
that Congress has no more power to regulate remedies than to 
regulate the decision-making process.98 The differences between 
determining liability and determining remedies, however, are 
large enough so that evidence of practice with respect to reme-
dies counts for little, if anything, concerning original understand-
ings of congressional power to regulate more direct aspects of 
the case-deciding process, such as the use of precedent. 
94. This understanding of the Rules of Decision Act-and the early materials that 
support it-was set forth by Justice Scalia in an important but generally overlooked opin-
ion in 1987. Sec Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 
162 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). But I actually owe these insights about the Rules of 
Decision Act to Lee Liberman Otis, to whom I am grateful. 
95. 28 U .S.C. § 2283 (1994) ("A court of the United States may not grant an injunc-
tion to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments."). 
96. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334-35. 
97. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1585 (cited in note 12). 
98. See notes 127-130 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, statutes abrogating prudential standing doctrines, 
which Professor Paulsen regards as "perhaps the most direct 
analogy to a statute abrogating stare decisis,"99 tell us nothing 
about original understanding. Not only are the statutes concern-
ing prudential standing a twentieth-century invention, but the 
prudential standing doctrine itself is a twentieth-century inven-
tion of highly dubious character. 100 Moreover, standing goes to 
the power of a court to hear the case, not to the manner in which 
a case within the court's jurisdiction should be decided. 
That leaves the Full Faith and Credit Act, 101 which dates 
back to 1790.102 This statute certainly regulates the judicial deci-
sion-making process by prescribing a choice-of-law rule and, 
more importantly, by specitring the manner in which the appli-
cable law must be proved. 10 The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
express~ authorizes Congress to pass such laws for state 
courts, 1 but if Congress has the same power with respect to 
federal courts, it must come from the Sweeping Clause. Accord-
ingly, the Full Faith and Credit Act does stand as a founding-era 
example of congressional regulation of judicial decision-making. 
99. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1585 (cited in note 12). 
I 00. If courts properly have jurisdiction over a case, it is hard to sec where they get 
the power to refuse to decide it. Some variant of prudential standing can perhaps be de-
fended as an exercise of remedial equitable discretion, cf. Steven G. Calabresi and Gary 
Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 Yale L.J. 255, 
257-65 (1992) (discussing remedial equitable discretion in the context of abstention doc-
trines), but such a doctrine would have to be calibrated to the circumstances of particular 
cases and would not implicate the jurisdiction of the courts. 
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) ("The records and judicial proceedings of any court of 
any ... State, Territory or Possession ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every 
court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."). 
I 02. Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122. 
I 03. See 28 U .S.C. § 1738 ("The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any 
such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in 
other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attesta-
tion of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certifica-
tion of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form."). This feature of 
the statute is more significant than the statute's direct choice of law rule because the ob-
ligation to apply state Jaw probably exists independently of statute, for the same reasons 
that the Rules of Decision Act is merely declaratory. See notes 83-85 and accompanying 
text. Moreover, John Harrison has suggested to me that choice of law rules are distin-
guishable from rules governing other aspects of judicial decisionmaking because they are 
rules of Jaw rather than rules about rules of law. If precedent is a sound (epistemologi-
cal) guide to such matters, Professor Harrison is almost certain to be right about this. 
104. The clause provides that "the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof." U.S. Const., Art. IV,§ 1. Linguistically, one could read this language as an ex-
press authorization to legislate for federal courts as well as state courts, but the context of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause makes such a reading dubious. 
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But that hardly constitutes such an overwhelming indication of 
the original understanding that it undermines the principle of 
decisional independence. It is more likely that the founders got 
one wrong than that the Constitution does not contain a princi-
ple of decisional independence. 
One can therefore glean little, if anything, about the original 
meaning of the Sweeping Clause from early congressional prac-
tice concerning regulation of judicial decision-making. That 
practice was too sparse and episodic to warrant any strong con-
clusions. 
B. THE LEGALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE 
So how much damage does the principle of decisional inde-
pendence do to the United States Code? The question turns out 
to be very complicated-too complicated to answer in full in a 
single article. I can only sketch out some general considerations 
that must guide the inquiry. 
Consider what appears to be the simplest case: congres-
sional statutes that regulate the standard of proof that courts 
must employ. Numerous statutes providing for judicial review of 
federal agency action specify that certain kinds of agency deci-
sions must be given some measure of deference by reviewing 
courts. Factual findings of administrative agencies are almost 
always subject to statutorily-mandated deferential review, and 
policy decisions may be reversed only if they are "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law. "105 The specification of a standard of proof is an essen-
tial part of the judicial decision-making process, so these statutes 
represent a direct challenge to the principle of decisional inde-
pendence. Indeed, they are hard to distinguish from a statute 
that flatly requires decision in favor of a specific party. There is 
not much distance between "decide the case in favor of X" and 
"decide the case in favor of X unless you determine that X's po-
sition approaches lunacy." Are all such statutes unconstitu-
tional? 
The straightforward answer is yes, but the path to that an-
swer is far from clear. The principle of decisional independence 
would seem quite obviously to deny Congress the power to die-
105. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). For a brief description of what this standard 
means in practice, see generally Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency 
Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 313 (1996). 
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tate something as fundamental to the case-deciding process as 
the standard of proof, but there are two considerations that re-
quire pause. First, at least in cases in which the government is 
the defendant, one must deal with the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. Under conventional doctrine, the federal government 
and its instrumentalities are immune from suit unless Congress 
expressly overrides the government's sovereign immunity and 
permits suit. 106 Moreover, conventional doctrine says that Con-
gress can condition its waivers of sovereign immunity to alter the 
usual rules of judicial proceedings, including denial of a right to 
an Article III adjudicator. 107 If this implication from the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity is correct, then perhaps Congress 
can regulate the standard of proof, or other aspects of the judi-
cial decision-making process, in cases that reach the courts only 
because of a waiver of sovereign immunity. 
There are two reasons, however, why this argument might 
not salvage statutes that regulate the standard of proof for re-
viewing agency decisions. First, the argument depends on the 
validity of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity. If suits 
against the government do not actually require congressional 
permission, then Congress obviously cannot claim any power to 
condition the suits on the alteration of baseline rules concerning 
judicial review. Academic commentators are virtually unani-
mous in their condemnation of sovereign immunity,108 but the 
true answer may be more complex than a simple up-or-down as-
sessment. Even if £overnmental accountability is a constitu-
tional requirement,1 the form of that accountability may be 
variable; the legitimacy of sovereign immunity may depend on 
the status of other doctrines, such as official immunity, the po-
litical question doctrine, and other bodies of law that regulate 
106. For a brief overview of the development of the doctrine of federal sovereign 
immunity and the "strict construction" rule that applies to statutory waivers, see Gregory 
C. Sisk, Litigation with the Federal Government 104-35, 143-59 (Foundation Press, 2000). 
107. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
272 (1855). 
108. See Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 739,763-754 n.126 (1999). 
109. For an interesting argument to this effect, see James E. Pfander, Sovereign Im-
munity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial 
Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 889 (1997). Guy Seidman and I have 
elsewhere criticized Professor Pfander's claim that the First Amendment right to petition 
bears on the constitutionality of sovereign immunity. See Lawson and Seidman, 93 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. at 763-66 (cited in note 108); but see James E. Pfander, Restoring the Right to 
Petition, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 219 (1999) (defending his thesis). Professor Pfander, how-
ever, can be completely wrong about the relevance of the right to petition while being 
completely right about a constitutional baseline rule of governmental accountability. 
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one's ability to challenge governmental action. 110 Guy Seidman 
and I plan to explore these issues in a subsequent article. Until 
that analysis is fully developed, I do not want to opine on the le-
gitimacy of federal sovereign immunity as an original matter. 
Second, even if one accepts that suits against government 
agencies require congressional permission, the standard move 
from a power to permit suit to a power to permit suit only on 
certain conditions is wrong. The move rests on the proposition 
that the greater power to control jurisdiction includes the lesser 
power to control the manner in which that jurisdiction is exer-
cised. But the power to control the decision-making process is 
not a lesser power than the power to control jurisdiction. It is a 
qualitatively different power that is either on the same level or, 
more likely, on a different scale than the power over jurisdiction. 
Congress controls the "jurisdiction" of the executive department 
by choosing which statutes to enact and by allocating funds, but 
that does not authorize Congress to specify, for instance, who 
should be prosecuted under each substantive statute. The legis-
lative power includes the power to determine (to some extent) 
the sphere of activity over which the executive power acts, but 
once that sphere is determined, the executive power is self-
executing. Similarly, Congress has some power (how much it is 
unnecessary to say here) to determine the jurisdiction of the 
various federal courts, but once that jurisdiction is conferred and 
the judicial power's sphere of activity is established, that power 
is self-executing. 111 Accordingly, the power to authorize suit, to 
the extent that such power exists in Congress, carries with it no 
ancillary power to prescribe the manner in which such suits must 
be heard and decided. Any such congressional power must find 
authorization in the Sweeping Clause and therefore must be 
"necessary and proper" for effectuating the federal judicial 
power.JJ2 
110. See Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing 
without Authority, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 581,594 (2000). 
111. On the self-executing character of the judicial power, sec Engdahl, 1999 B.Y.U. 
L. Rev. at 83-90 (cited in note 1). 
112. One could reach the same results by applying some variant of the "unconstitu-
tional conditions" doctrine, which forbids Congress from doing indirectly what it may not 
do directly. The precise contours, origins, and viability of that doctrine is a matter of on-
going controversy. Put less delicately, the subject is an odoriferous swamp. In one 
memorable two-year period, the doctrine generated, without any resolution, two major 
articles in the Harvard Law Review, sec Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 
Term, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 
102 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1413 (1989); and a full symposium in the San Diego Law Review, see Unconstitu-
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In any event, many statutes prescribing standards of proof 
do not involve suits against the government. Rule 52(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for instance, obligates federal 
appellate courts to defer to findings of fact br district courts 
unless those findings are "clearly erroneous." 11 This standard 
purports to govern all civil suits, including suits between private 
parties and suits in which the government is the plaintiff. One 
therefore cannot escape the need to determine the constitution-
ality of legislatively-specified standards of proof. 
A second consideration that might affect the constitutional-
ity of legislation prescribing a standard of proof is the distinction 
between questions of fact and questions of law. Although Con-
gress has occasionally legislated a standard of proof for proposi-
tions of law, 114 most legislative standards of proof concern review 
of factual findings. Professor Paulsen (whose proposed statute 
regulates the law-finding rather than fact-finding process) dis-
counts the significance of any proposed distinction between law 
and fact on the ground that " [ d]eciding questions of fact and de-
ciding questions of law are both part of the core judicial function 
of deciding cases and controversies."115 Professor Paulsen may 
well be right, but the answer is not as clear as he suggests. 
I have spent much of my professional life arguing that, for 
purposes of determining principles of proof, there is no theoreti-
cally valid distinction between law and fact. 116 The founding 
generation, alas, did not have the benefit of my wisdom. It 
adopted a Constitution that expressly recognizes a distinction be-
tween questions of law and fact. The so-called Exceptions 
Clause of Article III provides that the Supreme Court "shall 
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make." 117 The clause clearly assumes that there is a distinction, 
tiona[ Conditions Symposium, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 175-345 (1989). When one looks for 
constitutional grounding for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, however, one is led 
inexorably to the Sweeping Clause. Accordingly, direct analysis under the Sweeping 
Clause is much cleaner. 
113. FRCP 52( a). 
114. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1588-89 (cited in note 12). 
115. ld. at 1588. 
116. See Lawson, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 862-866 (cited in note 79); Gary Lawson, 
Proving Ownership, 11 Soc. Phil. & Policy 139 (1994); Gary Lawson, Legal Indetermi-
nacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 411 (1996). 
117. U.S. Const., Art. III,§ 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). It is "so-called" because it 
does not in fact authorize Congress to make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion but merely cross-references the power granted by the Sweeping Clause. See Eng-
dahl, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 119-32 (cited in note 1). 
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at least in some contexts, between questions of law and fact. 
Furthermore, the Seventh Amendment limits judicial review of 
jury decisions with respect to any "fact tried by a jury."118 And 
this is apart from the background assumptions of the surround-
ing legal order, which obviously sought to distinguish law from 
fact for many important legal purposes, as our legal system con-
tinues to do today. One must therefore take very seriously the 
idea that the Constitution places greater limits on congressional 
power to regulate the judicial decision-making process with re-
spect to law-finding than with respect to fact-finding. 
In the end, I would conclude that Professor Paulsen is right 
that law-finding and fact-finding are equally fundamental to the 
judicial process, but with a sense of unease that might prompt 
reconsideration. Given, then, that (1) the law-fact distinction 
probably does not affect congressional power to regulate judicial 
decision-making under the Sweeping Clause, (2) sovereign im-
munity, even if valid as a doctrine, does not permit Congress to 
exercise control over suits that it permits, and (3) many stan-
dard-of-proof statutes purport to regulate suits that do not im-
plicate federal sovereign immunity, the bottom line must be that 
federal statutes that prescribe a standard of proof for federal 
courts are per se unconstitutional. That conclusion encom-
passes, inter alia, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), section 
706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, and all of the organic 
statutes that prescribe standards of review for appeals from 
agency decisions. This does not mean that courts may never give 
deference to the views of other actors, such as administrative 
agencies or lower courts. The permissibility of judge-made def-
erence doctrines is another question altogether that turns on the 
distinction between legal and epistemological deference. 119 But 
Congress may not prescribe for the federal courts the amount of 
evidence that is required to prove legal propositions. 
If Congress cannot prescribe the standard of proof for legal 
propositions, does that mean that Congress cannot prescribe as 
well the admissibility or the weight of various pieces of evidence? 
The question is critical for two reasons. First, Professor 
Paulsen's proposed precedent-limiting statute is really a rule of 
evidence for propositions of law: in deciding certain classes of 
cases, the courts may not give decisive weight to prior decisions. 
Thus, the power of Congress to prescribe rules of admissibility 
118. U.S. Const., Amend. VII (emphasis added). 
119. Sec note 58. 
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or significance is the specific issue that Professor Paulsen has put 
before us. Second, if Congress cannot regulate the admissibility 
or weight of evidence, the consequences are very large-perhaps 
even larger than the consequences of invalidating congressional 
specification of a standard of proof. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence would be the most obvious casualty, and the Full Faith 
and Credit Act (at least those parts of it that prescribe the man-
ner in which state laws and decisions must be proved) would not 
be far behind. Subject only to some lingering doubts about the 
constitutional significance of a law-fact distinction in this con-
text, the unavoidable conclusion is that these statutes are uncon-
stitutional. The process of reasoning to a decision involves for-
mulating and applying rules of admissibility, rules of significance, 
and standards of proof. If Congress can regulate any stage of 
this process, it can effectively shape the process of decision-
making. The principle of decisional independence forbids this. 
Nor can Congress mandate that courts apply specific presump-
tions; a presumption is a direct regulation of the significance of 
certain pieces of evidence. And that is true whether or not the 
presumption is "irrebuttable." 
Rules of procedure, however, are another matter. There is 
no question that procedure can affect substance, so that seem-
ingly "procedural" rules can have an impact on substantive deci-
sion-making. The fact is familiar from many contexts.120 None-
theless, the distinction between substance and procedure is 
deeply engrained in our legal system. Procedural rules concern-
ing such matters as forms of pleading, methods for executing 
judgments, empanelling of juries, etc. are surely precisely the 
kinds of laws "for carrying into Execution" the judicial power 
that the Sweeping Clause is designed to authorize. It is possible, 
of course, for some of these procedural rules to affect the proc-
ess of decision-making in fairly direct ways; the order in which 
proof must be presented, for example, surely has the potential to 
affect decisions. How can we tell whether a congressional regu-
lation of judicial procedure trenches so deeply into the decision-
making process that it violates the principle of judicial inde-
pendence? 
120. As a mundane example: the Administrative Procedure Act exempts "rules of 
agency ... procedure" from notice-and-comment requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) 
(1994). When do rules of procedure, such as rules regulating the order in which evidence 
should be presented, shade into regulations of substance? The courts have no good an-
swer, and neither do I. See Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 281-84 (West 
Group, 2d cd. 2001). 
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Professors Engdahl and Redish have conveniently provided 
the solution. Professor Engdahl points out that any congres-
sional regulations of judicial procedure must, by an objective 
standard, be "for carrying into Execution" the judicial power. 121 
If the rule hinders rather than helps the execution of the judicial 
power, it is unconstitutional. Professor Redish adds that such 
procedural rules would be unconstitutional if they "so interfere 
with the courts' performance of the judicial function ... as to in-
vade the courts' 'judicial power' under Article III." 122 Although 
that proposition may sound absurdly circular ("a congressional 
rule unconstitutionally intrudes on the judicial power if it so in-
trudes on the judicial power as to be unconstitutional"), it is as 
sound a formulation of what is a "proper" procedural statute as 
we will find. This kind of circularity is common, and unavoid-
able, in many separation-of-powers contexts. For instance, the 
correct test for whether a statute vesting policymaking discretion 
in the executive is an improper, and therefore unconstitutional, 
delegation of legislative power is: "Congress must make what-
ever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory 
scheme at issue so that Congress must make them." 123 An "Offi-
cer[] of the United States" under the Appointments Clause is, 
essentially, any employee who is im~ortant enough to be called 
an "Officer[] of the United States."' 4 A principal officer under 
the Appointments Clause is, essentially, an officer who is impor-
tant enough to be considered principal. 125 There are matters for 
which the Constitution simply does not provide a bright line 
rule, so that one cannot avoid the exercise of judgment based on 
shades and degrees. The point at which procedural rules slip 
into substantive regulations of judicial decision-making is one of 
them. Accordingly, procedural rules must be assessed on a case-
121. Sec Engdahl,1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 172-74 (cited in note 1). 
122. Redish, 46 Mercer L. Rev. at 725 (cited in note 5). 
I 23. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
1231, 1239 (1994). 
124. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (defining an officer-correctly, in 
my view-as "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the 
United States"). 
125. This was Justice Souter's view in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651,566-669 
(1997) (Souter, J., concurring), in contrast to the majority's evident position that 
"[g]enerally speaking, the term 'inferior officer' connotes a relationship with some higher 
ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an 'inferior' officer de-
pends on whether he has a superior." I d. at 662. Although it feels strange to side with 
Justice Souter over Justice Scalia, the former has the better of the arguments on this 
point. 
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by-case basis to determine whether they unduly regulate the de-
cision-making process. 126 
That leaves congressional regulation of judicial remedies. 
The fashioning of a remedy is an essential aspect of deciding a 
case. 127 A law expanding the range of potential remedies avail-
able to a court is hard to challenge, but a law restricting a court's 
power to apply its traditional range of remedies is a fairly blatant 
interference with the decision-making process. Such laws either 
fail to "carry[] into Execution" the judicial power, are not 
"proper," or both. Professor Engdahl's brief but thoughtful 
analysis on this point seems largely right. 128 That means, inter 
alia, that the Anti-Injunction Act is unconstitutional, as are the 
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995129 that do 
not simply declare existing law. 130 
Professor Paulsen is entirely right that these conclusions 
represent an "extraordinary challenge to congressional ~ower 
and ... an extraordinary departure from settled law .... "1 1 His 
proposal to regulate by statute the courts' use of precedent is 
tame by comparison. But it is still wrong. 
126. For a thoughtful study of the line between substance and procedure, with a fo-
cus on the constitutionality of legislative presumptions, see generally D. Michael Ris-
inger, "Subsrance" and "Procedure" Revisited With Some Afterthoughts on the Constitu-
tional Problems of "Irrebuttable Presumptions", 30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 189 (1982). All of 
this stands apart from the debate whether prescribing rules of judicial procedure is a ju-
dicial function, a legislative function, or both. Sec Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent 
Power of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735 (2001). 
127. See Engdahl, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 170-71 (cited in note 1). 
128. !d. at 170-72. He is wrong in his defense of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agems of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to the extent that his discus-
sion goes beyond Bivens' claims about remedies to include the proposition that the Con-
stitution provides a direct substantive source of liability. But that is another article. 
129. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996) codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
3626 (1994 Supp. IV). 
130. The key provision of this statute provides that prison injunctions must be lifted 
.. if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the 
relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the 
Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the 
Federal right." 18 U.S.C § 3626(b)(2). To the extent that this formulation departs from 
traditional rules for lifting injunctions, it is invalid. The precise question in Miller-
whether Congress can provide for an automatic stay of injunctions-piggybacks on this 
issue. 530 U.S. at 331 (cited in note 4) see also 18 U.S.C § 3626(e)(2) The most interest-
ing provision of this statute, however, is the provision forbidding courts from terminating 
injunctions if they make "written findings" that the substantive terms of§ 3626(b)(2) are 
satisfied. Can Congress attach special significance to the "writtenness" of judicial find-
ings (or require courts to announce their decisions in Latin or to spray shaving cream on 
litigants who raise frivolous evidentiary objections)? The answer depends on whether 
such statutes merely prescribe rules of procedure. Sec notes 120-126 and accompanying 
text. 
131. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1590 (cited in note 12). 
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IV 
Professor Paulsen raises the specter of an "uncontrollable 
judiciary" 132 and "an uncheckable judicial power to prescribe 
rules at variance with the Constitution," 133 which suggests that 
the alternative to his statute is a regime in which courts are free 
to choose any method of decision-making, and any theory of 
precedent, without external control. This is not true. Even 
without Professor Paulsen's statute, the Constitution prescribes 
two methods for controlling judicial use of precedent or any 
other decision-making methodology. Professor Paulsen even al-
ludes to these methods, both of which are near and dear to his 
(and my) heart. 
First, Congress does indeed have the power to control judi-
cial uses of precedent, but only through the constitutionally pre-
scribed method of impeachment. The reach of the impeachment 
power is beyond the scope of this article, 134 but that power does 
allow Congress to impeach and remove a judge based on that 
judge's decision-making process. Consider, for example, a judge 
who decides cases based on the race of the parties, or the num-
ber of letters in the parties' names, or the positions of planetary 
bodies. Professor Paulsen would have no trouble with the 
proposition that such judges could be impeached and removed 
from office, 135 and he would be right. 
The Constitution provides for impeachment for "Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 136 The 
phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is a term of art that is 
not coextensive with the universe of indictable crimes. 137 It re-
fers generally to abuse of office or neglect of duty, 138 and judges 
who egregiously fail to decide cases in accordance with law are 
both abusing their offices and neglecting their duty. 139 If Con-
132. Id. at 1581. 
133. Id. 
134. Chris Moore and I have elsewhere discussed the impeachment power at some 
length in the context of presidential refusals to enforce unconstitutional statutes. See 
Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1307-12 (cited in note 26). Much of that discus-
sion, as we then recognized, see id. at 1311-12, is applicable to judicial impeachments and 
removals as well. 
135. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1600-01 (cited in note 12). 
136. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 4. 
137. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1307 n.191 (cited in note 26) (noting 
the scholarly consensus on this point). 
138. Sec id. at 1308-09. 
139. How "egregiously" must the judges flaunt the law in order to trigger the possi-
bility of impeachment? That is a topic for another article, which I have no plans or desire 
to write. It is enough for now to establish that dccisionmaking methodologies arc fair 
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gress views a particular methodology as akin to reliance on as-
trology, impeachment and removal of a judge for consistent ap-
plication of that methodology seems to be well within Congress' 
constitutional power. 
This conclusion is not beyond question. Professor Redish 
has forcefully defended a much more limited role for the im-
peachment power, based largely on the principle of decisional 
independence. 140 He (rightly) worries that an extensive im-
peachment power could blunt the force of an independent judi-
ciary.141 I cannot join issue with him here, 142 but suffice it to say 
that Professor Redish explicitly rejects an originalist approach to 
determining the range of the impeachment power. 14 It is one 
thing to use the principle of decisional independence to give con-
tent to a "proper" distribution of governmental powers. It is an-
other thing altogether to use the principle to undercut a well-
understood (in 1789) understanding of the phrase "high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors." Because the ultimate originalist inquiry is 
hypothetical rather than historical, however, it is not impossible 
that even an established understanding could be wrong-
because, for example, it failed to grasp certain essential features 
of the overall constitutional structure. Accordingly, Professor 
Redish's position cannot be casually dismissed by originalists. 
But if one is going to bring constitutional principles to bear on 
this inquiry (and one should), the principle of coordinacy, which 
is as fundamental as the principle of decisional independence, 
cuts in favor of the rather clear original understanding of the im-
peachment power. If it is unlikely that the Constitution, with its 
careful scheme of divided power, permits Congress to control 
the process of judicial decision-making by statute, it is just as 
unlikely that the Constitution provides no mechanism at all for 
controlling rogue judicial decision-making. 
If courts are indeed abusing the doctrine of precedent, then 
Congress can control that abuse through the impeachment proc-
ess-with all of the cumbersome mechanisms that that process 
entails. But Congress can no more circumvent its responsibilities 
game in principle for the impeachment power and that a consistent pattern of application 
of faulty methodologies is an impeachable offense, even if a single, random faulty deci-
sion would not be. 
140. Sec Redish, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 675,682-86 (cited in note 20). 
141. See id. at 685-86. 
142. Chris Moore's and my prior discussion of this topic, see Lawson and Moore, 81 
Iowa L. Rev. at 1307-12 (cited in note 26), was in large measure a response to some of 
Professor Redish's earlier-expressed views. 
143. See Redish, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 680-82 (cited in note 20). 
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to police the judicial department under the Impeachment 
Clauses by passing ordinary legislation than it can circumvent its 
responsibilities to police the executive department under the im-
peachment power by passing ordinary legislation, such as laws 
providing for independent counsels. 
Second, the President has the power to control judicial 
abuses of precedent through the power to refuse to enforce 
judgments. Professor Paulsen has elsewhere defended a presi-
dential power to refuse to enforce judgments that the President 
believes are unconstitutional. 144 Chris Moore and I have else-
where defended a somewhat lesser presidential power to refuse 
to enforce judgments when the President believes with a very 
high degree of confidence that they are unconstitutional. 145 In ei-
ther case, the President has some degree of power to ensure that 
the judicial decision-making process stays within proper bounds. 
Neither of these methods of control, of course, is as sweep-
ing or as easy to implement as Professor Paulsen's statute. But 
that is the Framers' fault-or, perhaps, their wisdom. 
144. See Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 228-292 (cited in note 56). 
145. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1324-29 (cited in note 26). 
